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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STANDARD OPTICAL COMPANY, 
0b ai., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
eft al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
STANDARD OPTICAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-AppelUmt, 
vs. 
LAWRENCE A. JONES, as Salt Lake 
City Auditor, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case concerns the legality of proceedings under 
the Municipal Improvement District Act, Chapter 16, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Consolidated cases No. 220475 and No, 221266 were 
Case No. 
13924 
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argued on Motions for Summary Judgment by both 
plaintiffs and defendants and the issue of the interpre-
tation of the construction contract was the subject of a 
trial before the Court. The Complaint filed by Standard 
Optical Company, et al., in Civil No. 220475, was dis-
missed with prejudice on the merits, no cause of action. 
The Court in so ruling, however, ruled against defendant 
Salt Lake City Corporation with respect to its conten-
tion that the action brought by plaintiff was premature 
and distinguished the case from Dawson v. Swapp, 26 
Utah 2d 250, 487 P. 2d 1288 (1971), cited by defendants. 
The Court denied the Petition for a Writ of Prohibition 
as prayed for in Civil No. 221266. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the proceedings leading to 
the formation of improvement district Curb & Gutter 
Extension No. 38-480 declared unlawful; and that said 
district has no jurisdiction for making the alleged im-
provements in said district including but not limited to 
improvements not stated in the notice of intention, to-
wit; the narrowing of Main Street, the lowering of the 
grade of Main Street, and the enlarging of the base 
of the Brigham Young Monument; for a declaration that 
the contracts entered into between Salt Lake City Cor-
poration and Gibbons and Reed Company on the 12th 
day of June, 1974, and the 5th day of September, 1974, 
are unlawful and void and that defendants Salt Lake 
City Corporation and Gibbons and Reed Company be 
enjoined and restrained from performing under said con-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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structdon contmcte; and for a Writ of Prohibition pro-
hibiting the officials of Salt Lake City Corporation from 
paying any further monies or sums to Gibbons and Reed 
Company for the furnishing of labor and material inci-
dent to the aforesaid construction contracts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 4, 1973, Joseph S. Fenton, City Engi-
neer for Salt Lake City Corporation, presented his re-
port to the Commissioner of Streets of Salt Lake City 
recommending that Curb & Gutter Extension No. 38-480 
(The Salt Lake City Beautification Project) be approved 
and that the City Attorney be directed to prepare a 
notice of intention for the formation of the improvement 
district (R. 110, Dist. Ct. No. 220475). On December 
18, 1973, the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City 
approved the notice of intention as prepared by the City 
Attorney and moved that it be published in the legal 
section of the Deseret News, and that protests be con-
sidered concerning the proposed district on January 17, 
1974 (R. 57, Dist. Ct. No. 220475). 
A copy of the notice of intention thus adopted is 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the Complaint (R. 8, Dist. 
Ct. No. 220475). The notice of intention, among other 
things, describes the improvements to be made as fol-
lows: 
"* * * to remove all existing curbs, gutters, 
sidewalks, and street paving and construct new 
street paving, pedestrian paving, landscape 
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structures, planters and planting, curbs, and 
gutters together with new street lighting and 
drainage structures and to do all other work 
necessary to complete the project in accord-
ance with Salt Lake City standards." 
It goes on to state: 
"* * * all other necessary things shall be done 
to complete the whole project in a proper and 
workmanlike manner according to plans, pro-
files, and specifications on file in the office 
< of the Salt Lake City Engineer * * *". 
The notice further stated: 
"All protests and objections to the carrying 
out of such intention must be presented in 
writing * * * on or before the 16th day of 
January, 1974. The Board of Commissioners, 
at its first regular meeting thereafter, to-wit; 
the 17th day of January, 1974, will consider 
such protests and objections to said improve-
ments as have been made." 
The Trial Court found that the proposed improve-
ments included the narrowiing of the vehicular traveled 
portion of Main Street by approximately 24 feet, the 
lowering of the grade of the street by approximately 1 
foot between South Temple Street and 300 South Street, 
and the blocking of North-South traffic on Main Street 
through its South Temple intersection by the enlarge-
ment of the base of the Brigham Young Monument (R. 
290, Dist. Ct. No. 220475). The improvements just re-
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ferred to were not described in the notice of intention 
except as may be encompassed by the reference to "plans, 
profiles, and specifications on file in the office of the 
Salt Lake City Engineer." 
On January 17, 1974, the date set for the hearing 
of protests, some discussion was had with regard to the 
objections, but Mayor Gam discouraged discussion unltil 
after the City Engineer had tabulated the protests and 
determined the percentage protesting (Deposition of 
E. J. Garn, pages 21 and 22, Appendix pages 16, 17, and 
18). The hearing was not adjourned to a fixed date, but 
a second meeting was held by the Board of Commission-
ers on January 25, 1974, pursuant to written notice to 
the property owners (R. 295, Dist. Ct. No. 220475). 
Based upon the Engineer's tabulation, owners owning 
51.32% of the property to be assessed filed protests by 
January 17, 1974. On February 4, 1974, three of the 
property owners withdrew their protests reducing the 
percentage of protestors to 44.4% (R. 152, Dist. Ct. 
No. 220475, Appendix page 1). 
The City Commission had a long standing policy 
of not creating an improvement district if over 50% 
of the property owners protested, which policy was re-
affirmed by the City Commission at the meeting on the 
17th day of January, 1974 (R. 47-409, 296, Dist. Ct. No. 
220475). The Board of Commissioners on March 20, 
1974, nevertheless authorized the City Engineer to pro-
ceed with the project as described in the notice of in-
tention (R. 69, Dist. Ct. No. 220475). 
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On the 14th day of February, 1974, notice to con-
tractors was published for the construction of Curb & 
Gutter Extension No. 38-480 (R. 80, Dist. Ct. No. 
220475). This was the only notice to contractors which 
was published (Appendix page 27). A number of con-
tractors picked up the plans and specifications pursuant 
to the Notice but bids were submitted by only two con-
tonactors for the construction of the improvements, to-
wit; Shocker Construction Company in the amount of 
$4,771,581.95; and Gibbons and Reed Construction Com-
pany in the amount of $4,123,254.15 (Tr. 548, R. 71, 
Dist. C t No. 220475). 
Since the lowest bid was substantially in excess of 
the Engineer's estimate for the project of $2,875,189.75, 
the bid of Gibbons and Reed Company was not accepted 
as submitted. On May 1, 1974, upon recommendation 
of Joseph S. Fenton, City Engineer, the City Commis-
sion accepted an "adjusted bid with deletions" of Gib-
bons and Reed Company of $2,834,180.96 (R. 71, Dist 
Ot. No. 220475). Thereafter on June 12, 1974, a contract 
was entered into between the City and Gibbons and 
Reed Company (R. 53, Dist. Ct. No. 220475). 
The June 12th contract and the plans and specifica-
tions on file on that date did not include a "drainage 
system" or a "grout system" sidewalk, items which were 
required to complete the project and which were made 
necessary by the deletion of the more expensive storm 
sewer and suspended sidewalk system provided for in the 
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original plans and specifications (R. 48, 49, Dist. Ot. 
No. 221266). 
The City and Gibbons and Reed Company executed 
a Supplemental Agreement (Exhibit T-ID, Appendix 
pages 9, 10, 11), dated September 5, 1974, whereby line 
items 91 through 98 and 106 through 111 of the June 
contract were deleted, and new items inserted under 
those item numbers. By making the changes as afore-
said, Gibbons and Reed Company and Salt Lake City 
Corporation included the "grout system" in the contract 
and agreed that the total contract price would be in-
creased by the sum of $784.02. The Trial Court deter-
mined that the June 12th contract included the cost 
of the "grout system" but that the "grout system" and 
specific costs for the same were not identified as such 
in the contract (R. 48, Dist. Ct. No. 221266). 
The shallow drainage system was the subject of an 
"order for extra work" dated July 2, 1974, for the addi-
tional sum of $14,725.00 over the contract price (Exhibit 
T7-P). 
The June 12th contract was awarded to Gibbons 
and Reed Company on the theory that it was the lowest 
bidder at the $4,123,254.15 figure and at the "adjusted 
bid" figure of $2,834,180.96 (R. 71, Dist. Ct. No. 220475). 
The City Commission considered the question of rebid-
ding the project after the need for making deletions, ad-
ditions, and revising the plans became apparent, but 
decided against rebidding for reasons to the effect that 
rebidding would involve higher July costs rather than 
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February costs, that rebidding would delay the October 
completion date of the first phase, and for the further 
reason that experience of the City indicated that costs 
could not be cot by rebidding of a contract (Tr. 539, 
540). 
On May 1, 1974, the Board of City Commissioners 
of Salt Lake City approved an interfund loan of $876,-
000.00 from the City's General Fund to the newly cre-
ated special improvement district and a promissory note 
was executed obligating the spedal improvement district 
to repay to the General Fund of Salt Lake City the sum 
of $876,000.00 together with interest thereon at the rate 
of four per cent per annum, cxHnmencing May 1, 1974 
(Appendix pages 37, 38, 39). On July 15, 1974, the first 
partial estimate in the amount of $17,375.13 was sub-
mitted for payment by Gibbons and Reed Company for 
work and material furnished in connection with the con-
struction of the project, which amount was paid on July 
19, 1974, by Warrant No. 688 (Exhibit P-l to Deposition 
of Lawrence A. Jones). Ota July 31, 1974, petitioner, 
Standard Optical Company, filed a separate action for 
a Writ of Prohibition, Civil No. 221266, by which, among 
other things, it sought to prohibit the therein named city 
officials from paying any funds to Gibbons and Reed 
Company for improvements not stated in the notice of 
intention (R. 1-12, Diet. Ct. No. 221266, Appendix pages 
40-45). An Alternative Writ of Prohibition was issued 
by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on the 31st day 
of July, 1974, which included an Order to Show Cause 
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setting the hearing on the matter for the 15th day of 
August, 1974 (R. 13-23, Diet. Ct. No. 221266, Appendix 
pages 49-50). On the 1st day of August, 1974, however, 
the City Attorney filed an ex parte motion before the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson for an Order Vacating 
the Alternative Writ of Prohibition which was signed 
by Judge Hanson on the 1st day of August, 1974 (R. 25-
26, Dist. Ct. No. 221266, Appendix page 51). Thereafter 
petitioner, Standard Optical Company filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Order Vacating the Alternative 
Writ of Prohibition. This latter motion, together with 
a motion to consolidate the two civil actions were 
heard at the same time the Motions for Summary Judg-
ment were considered (R. 28-29 and 32-33, Dist. Ct. 
No. 221266). The Motion for Reconsideration was de-
nied for the reason assigned by the Trial Court that the 
Alternative Writ of Prohibition was in effect a tempor-
ary restraining order and no bond had been filed in con-
nection therewith; the Court granted respondents' mo-
tion to consolidate Civil No. 221266 with Civil No. 220475 
since the issue of lack of jurisdiction was common to 
both matters (R. 37-40, Dist. Ct. No. 221266). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
PROCEEDINGS LEADING TO THE FOR-
MATION OF CURB & GUTTER EXTEN-
SION NO. 38-480 WERE IRREGULAR AND 
CONTRARY TO LAW AND IN VIOLATION 
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OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS AS CONTEM-
PLATED BY SECTIONS 10-16-7 AND 10-16-
28, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Section 10-16-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides, among other things, that an owner of property 
to be assessed in a special improvement district shall 
have the right within the time designated in the notice 
of intention to file a protest to the creation of the dis-
trict or to make any other objections relating thereto. 
The notice of intention set forth January 16, 1974, as the 
deadline for filing written objections to the formation 
of the District. According to the tabulation of votes 
porepared by Joseph S. Fenton, and which is set forth 
in the Appendix, page 1, to this brief, 51.32% of the 
property owners filed written objections to the formation 
of the improvement district as of the 17th day of Jan-
uary, 1974. 
Mayor Garn testified that the City Commission had 
a policy of long standing that if a majority of the prop-
erty owners protested the formation of an improvement 
district, the City would not go forward with the project. 
This policy had been adopted by the City notwithstand-
ing the statutory provision contained in Section 10-16-
7(3) (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides 
that protests representing two^thirds of the property 
to be assessed are necessary to deprive the City of jur-
isdiction to form a district. The City policy of not fol-
lowing the two-thirds provision has been in effect as long 
as Mayor Gam has been connected with City govern-
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ment and he was told by others that that has been the 
poicy of Salt Lake City since, in effect, the beginning 
of time (Appendix page 15). This policy was publicly 
reaffirmed by the City Commissioners on the 17th day 
of January, 1974, at the time and place set for the hear-
ing of protests concerning the formation of the district; 
each of the Commissioners attending the meeting de-
clared in the presence of those in attendance, that if 
over 50% of the property owners objected, the City Com-
missioners would not approve the district (R. 47-49, Dist. 
a . No. 220475). 
The tabulation of votes was not known on the 17th 
day of January and Mayor Garn discouraged discussions 
with reference to the formation of the improvement dis-
trict on that day for the reason that a tabulation of the 
votes had not yet been made. In this connection Mayor 
Garn said to the people at the meeting, among other 
things, 
"* * * I * * * explained to the people that were 
there, * * * that we could not make a decision 
on the district until we had a tabulation. And 
I made the comment * * * that we could stay 
there all day or into next week and either 
the pros or cons could be verbally discussed 
but that it could not alter the vote * * *." 
(Appendix page 16) 
Notwithstanding the declaration of the Mayor to 
abide by the tabulation of votes filed on the 10th day of 
January, 1974, the Oity Commission allowed property 
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owners to withdraw objections on February 4, 1974, as in-
dicated by the tabulation of votes referred to above which 
resulted in a 44.4% vote against the project instead of 
51.32%. What was attempted in these particulars is 
contrary to Armstrong v. Ogden City, 12 Utah 476, 43 
P. 119 (1895), and Salt Lake and U. R. Co. v. Payson 
City, 66 Utah 521, 244 P. 138 (1926), which hold in 
effect that the City Commission cannot consider with-
drawals after the time set for filing of protests. In the 
Armstrong case, supra, the City Council published a 
notice of intention designating the 29th day of March, 
1892, as the time to hear objections in writing to the 
proposed improvement district. Before the appointed 
time, a majority of abutting property owners had filed 
protests. The City Council did not act upon the pro-
tests at the time appointed but adjourned from time to 
time until April 4, 1892. In the meantime some of the 
owners previously protesting had withdrawn their pro-
tests in order to make the protests contain less than 
one-half of the entire frontage in the paving district. 
Thereafter the City Council, without publishing a new 
notice of intention, adopted an ordinance creating the 
district. The Court held that two essential facts were 
necessary before the City Council could acquire jurisdic-
tion; (1) that a proper and legal notice of intention had 
to be published, and (2) that more than one-half of the 
front feet abutting upon the street to be improved had 
failed to object within the time specified (the statute 
then in effect provided for a 50% protest). The Court 
went on to say, 
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"The statute above referred to sufficiently 
answers this contention. I t expressly denies 
to the city council jurisdiction to proceed with 
the improvements, if, at the time fixed to hear 
objections, a sufficient remonstrance is pre-
sented. At that time, such a remonstrance was 
presented. The city council was thereby wholly 
deprived of power to proceed. No power could 
be subsequently acquired in that proceeding. 
A new proceeding might be instituted, and, 
after due notice of intention, new power could 
be obtained. The parties protesting and not 
withdrawing acquired a right to rely upon the 
statute existing at the time appointed to hear 
objections, and were entitled to notice of any 
action affecting their interest. It may also be 
that others who desired to object refrained 
from so doing upon ascertaining that a suffi-
cient protest was already filed/' (Emphasis 
added) 
The instant case is similar in this regard. Had the 
protestors known that withdrawals would be allowed 
after the 16th of January, 1974, and that a two-thirds 
requirement would be applied instead of a majority, 
others who refrained from doing so, thinking that a suf-
ficient protest had already been filed, may have protested 
the district. 
The City should not now be heard to say that the 
abutting property owners are bound by the statutory 
two-thirds requirement in light of the long standing pol-
icy of the City which was reaffirmed on the 17th of Jan-
uary that a majority would control. There is no reason 
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why the City, who has discretion in the first instance 
to propose an improvement district, should not be bound 
by its own policy with regard to the number of protes-
tors required to defeat the project. To do otherwise 
would violate fundamental principles of due process and 
fair play and go to the justice of the proceeding as con-
templated by Section 10-16-28, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
The case of Salt Lake and U. R. Co. v. Payson City, 
supra, is likewise in point. In that case protests were 
withdrawn during the period of time allowed for the 
filing of protests . The Court stated in this connection, 
"There can be no question that the property 
owners who withdrew their protests have the 
right to protest the improvement, and, in our 
judgment, likewise have the right to withdraw 
their protests at any time before the time for 
filing protests had expired. 
According to the notice of intention in the instant 
matter, all protests were to be filed by the 16th day of 
January, 1974. The City should not have allowed pro-
tests to be withdrawn after that date, and it is sub-
mitted that the tabulation of votes of protestors stands 
at 51.32% as determined by the city engineer. If the 
City had determined after the meeting of the 17th day 
of January, 1974, to change its policy in favor of the 
two-thirds requirement, it should have done so only 
after the publication of a notice to that effect so as 
not to lull the property owners into a false sense of 
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security and in order to give them a fair and reasonable 
opportunity to present their protests under tihat stan-
dard. The trial Court determined that the City had such 
a policy but that it was a matter of discretion only and 
did not affect the jurisdiction of the commission to pro-
ceed should they desire to do so (R. 296, Dist. Ct. No. 
220475). It is submitted that the trial court erred in 
this regard and that Improvement District No. 38-480 
was improperly formed and that the City had no juris-
diction to proceed in the premises. 
POINT II. 
ASSUMING CURB & GUTTER EXTENSION 
NO. 38-480 WAS PROPERLY FORMED, IT 
HAS NO JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY 
FOR M A K I N G IMPROVEMENTS NOT 
STATED IN THE NOTICE OF INTENTION, 
TO-WIT; THE NARROWING OF THE VE-
HICULAR TRAVELED PORTION OF MAIN 
STREET, THE LOWERING OF THE GRADE 
OF MAIN STREET BETWEEN SOUTH 
TEMPLE STREET AND 300 S O U T H 
STREET, OR THE ENLARGING OF THE 
BASE OF THE BRIGHAM YOUNG MONU-
MENT SO AS TO FORECLOSE NORTH-
SOUTH TRAFFIC AT THE INTERSEC-
TION OF SOUTH TEMPLE. 
The trial Court found in its first memorandum de-
cision that the proposed improvements included the nar-
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rowing of Main Street by 24 feet, that the grade of the 
street would be lowered approximately 1 foot, and that 
North-South traffic would be blocked at the South Tem-
ple intersection by the enlargement of the base of the 
Brigham Young Monument (R. 290, Dist. Ct. No. 
220475). As previously stated, there was no mention of 
these improvements in the notice of intention. 
Section 10-16-5(1) (d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides with regard to the description of improvements 
as follows: 
"In a general way, describe the improvements 
proposed to be made showing the places the 
improvements are proposed to be made and 
the general nature of the improvements. The 
improvements may be described by type or 
kind and the place such improvements are pro-
posed to be made may be described by refer-
ence to streets or portions of streets or ex-
tensions of streets or by any other means the 
governing body may choose which reasonably 
describes the improvements proposed to be 
made. 
The narrowing of the street, the enlarging of the 
base of the Brigham Young Monument, and the changing 
of the grade were significant and important parts of the 
proposed improvements (Appendix pages 21, 22, 23, and 
24). Mayor Gam testified in this regard: 
"Q. With reference to the project, did you 
feel that it was necessary to advise the prop-
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erty owners and the people of the City general-
ly that the street or at least the vehicular 
traveled portion of the street would be nar-
rowed by approximately 24 feet as a result of 
project? 
A. Well, yes. And it was very widely publi-
cized for a long period of time, and partic-
ularly in light of the E P A hearings in July 
which had a great amount of coverage and 
discussion. 
Q. So it stood out in your mind as a very 
important item? 
A. Well, I think any project of the size of 
this is important, not any one particular 
aspect of it. But it is important that the prop-
erty owners who are going to pay the bill be 
particularly advised as to what is going to 
happen." (Appendix page 23). 
The notice of intention did not advise the abutting 
property owners of what was going to happen. Anyone 
reading the description of improvements in the notice 
of intention would have come to the conclusion that no 
changes were going to be made in the width, gmde, or 
flow of traffic on Main Street. The notice of intention 
describes the improvements as follows, to-wit: 
"To remove all existing curbs, gutters, side-
walks, and street paving and to construct new 
street paving, pedestrian paving, landscape 
structures, planters and planting, curbs, and 
gutters, together with new street lighting and 
drainage structures * * *". 
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The failure of the notice of intention to mention any 
other physical items may have caused a person not to 
protest the formation of the District who would have 
otherwise done so, and it is by this standard that the 
notice of intention should be measured. The City has the 
duty to act in good faith and forthrightly in preparing 
a notice of intention as required by the statute so as to 
fully advise all property owners of the essential nature 
of the improvements. The Utah Supreme Court has 
passed on matters of this kind before. Gwilliam v. Ogden 
City, 49 Utah 155, 164 P. 1022 (1917), is in point. In 
that case, the notice of intention failed to state that the 
grade of the street would be lowe(red for a distance of 
more than 1,000 feet from a depth of 2 inches at one end 
to a depth of 1 foot on the other. The statute then in 
effect provided as follows: 
" ' In all cases before the levy of any taxes 
for improvements provided for in this chapter, 
the city council shall give notice of intention 
to levy said taxes, naming the purposes for 
which the taxes are to be levied * * *. Such 
notice shall describe the improvements so pro-
posed, the boundaries of the District to be 
affected or benefited by such improvements, 
and the estimated costs of such improve-
ments * * *' ". 
The Gwilliam case was cited recently by the Supreme 
Ctourt in the case of Lewis v. Kanab City, U. 2d .., 
523 P. 2d 417 (1974); along with Jones v. Foulger, 46 
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Utah 416, 150 P. 933 (1915); and Ryberg v. Lundstrom, 
70 Utah 517, 261 P. 453 (1927). 
The trial Court, however, determined that the Gwil-
liam case was not in point for the reason that the statute 
was changed to provide that improvements could be de-
scribed in a "general way" by type or kind and that since 
the notice was to the effect that the street, sidewalks, 
curbs, and gutters were to be removed and replaced in 
accordance with plans and specifications on file in the 
Engineer's office, that that described in a "general way" 
the improvements to be made. It is submitted that the 
trial Court was in error. The standard under the old 
statute should be no different than the standard under 
the present statute so far as apprising the abutting prop-
erty owners of the general nature of the improvements 
proposed to be made. They are, after all, entitled 
to protest against the formation of the district and they 
are the ones who will be charged with paying the bill 
as stated by Mayor Garn. It would have been a simple 
thing, indeed, to have mentioned these items in the no-
tice of intention. To require the property owners to go 
to the City Engineer's office and sift through plans and 
specifications to determine the nature of the project, 
is absolutely ridiculous and is contrary to the manifest 
purpose of the statute. Section 10-16-7(2), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, highlights the importance of adequately 
describing the improvements in the notice of intention, 
for it provides, among other things, that the governing 
body "* * * may not provide for the making of any 
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improvements not stated in the notice of intention 
It is submitted that the notice of intention is fun-
damentally defective and that the City has no jurisdic-
tion under Curb & Gutter Extension No. 38-480 to nar-
row the vehicular traveled portion of Main Street, change 
the grade of the street, or block North-South traffic at 
the South Temple intersection. 
POINT III. 
STATUTORY PROCEDURES WERE NOT 
FOLLOWED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
NARROWING OF MAIN STREET. 
Section 10-8-8.2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, re-
quires among other things, that before a street can be 
narrowed or vacated an ordinance must be passed which 
ordinance must be based upon the opinion of the govern-
ing body that there is good cause for vacating or nar-
rowing the street or any part thereof and that such va-
cation or narrowing will not be detrimental to the gen-
eral interest. No such ordinance was passed. The trial 
Court determined in effect that Section 10-8-8.2 was not 
the only way that a street could be narrowed and that 
improvements under an improvement district could in-
clude the narrowing of a street without the requisite 
adoption of an ordinance pursuant to the above section* 
There is no specific authority under the Improve-
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ment District Act for narrowing a street, Section 10-16-
6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in this regard states: 
"(a) To establish grades and layout, estab-
lish, open, extend, and widen any street, side-
walk, alley, or off-street parking facility;" 
(emphasis added) 
It is submitted that the trial Judge erred in holding, in 
effect, that the narrowing of Main Street could be done 
under the authority of the Improvement District Act 
without enacting an ordinance. 
The Court also concluded that "street" in the con-
text of Section 10-8-8.2, supra, meant the right-of-way 
from property line to property line and that the right-
of-way was not being narrowed. "Street" is a term that 
has various meanings depending on the context in which 
it is used. For example: 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, 
Streets and Bridges, Section 1, page 402, states: 
"In some instances and for partcular purposes 
the term 'highway' has been defined to encom-
pass the entire right-of-way, including the 
shoulder and other places open to travel, but 
in other instances and for other purposes the 
term has been defined narrowly so as to ex-
clude the exterior boundaries of the right-of-
way and confine its meaning to that part of a 
public road open to the use of the public for 
the purpose of vehicular travel." 
The case of Public Utilities Commission of Utah v. Jones, 
54 Utah 111, 179 P. 745 (1919), recognized that the term 
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"public highway" had different meanings depending upon 
the context in which it was used. 
From the context of Chapter 8, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1053, in which the aforesaid statutory section is 
found it is apparent that the legislature was thinking 
of "street" as the vehicular traveled portion. Section 
10-8-8, for example, in delineating the powers of the 
cities, separately refers to streets and sidewalks, as fol-
lows: 
"They may lay out, establish, open, alter, 
widen, grade, pave, or otherwise improve 
streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, side-
walks * * *". 
That same chapter, at Section 10-8-23, grants authority 
to the city to impose upon the owners or occupants of 
property the duty of keeping the sidewalks in front of 
their property free from snow, litter, ice and obstructions, 
and defines sidewalks as that portion lying in front of 
the property to the curb line of the street. 
It is submitted that the word "street" as used in 
Section 10-8-8.2, means the vehicular traveled portion of 
the street and not the entire right-of-way. 
As a general proposition, procedures for narrowing 
a street must be strictly foUowed. This general principle 
has been enunciated in the cases of Hall v. North Ogden 
City, 109 Utah 304, 166 P. 2d 221 (1946), and Boskovich 
v. Midvale City Corporation, 121 Utah 445, 343 P. 2d 
435 (1953). In the latter case, the court stated, 
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"We believe and hold that the procedure fol-
lowed by Midvale in this case sans notice, peti-
tion, or hearing, was an unquestioned depar-
ture from the elementary principle t h a t 
property cannot be taken without due process 
of law and without just compensation." 
An annotation appearing at 175 A. L. R. 760, entitled, 
"Necessity for Adhering to Statutory Procedure Pre-
scribed for Vacation, Discontinuance, or Change of Route 
of Street or Highway", likewise sets forth the general 
proposition that statutory procedures must be strictly 
followed. 
Section 10-8-8.2, supra, manifests the legislative in-
tent that narrowing of a street is a matter that should 
be done only upon serious deliberation, a condition which 
was wholly lacking in the instant matter when consid-
ered in light of the fact that there was no mention in the 
notice of intention that the street would be narrowed. 
It is submitted that the trial Court's definition of 
"street" to mean the right-of-way from property line to 
property line is in error and contrary to the plain mean-
ing of the statute as applied to the facts of this case. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SETTING 
ASIDE THE ORDER VACATING THE AL-
TERNATIVE WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND 
A PERMANENT WRIT OF PROHIBITION 
SHOULD BE ISSUED. 
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The Order Vacating the Alternative Writ of Pro-
hibition in Civil No. 221266 was granted upon the ex 
parte application of the City Attorney without notice 
to petitioner. I t appears from the Order (Appendix page 
51) that the reason the Writ was set aside was that no 
bond was posted. The answer to the Writ of Prohibition 
which was subsequently filed, however, does not raise 
this as a defense (Appendix page 46-48). 
Rule 65B (b)(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
grants authority to the Court to arrest ministerial pro-
ceedings when it appears that officials are about to act 
without or in excess of their jurisdiction. There is no 
i^uirement in that rule for the posting of a bond. The 
posting of a bond is applicable to Rule 65A, entitled "In-
junctions". It would be a strange thing indeed if a bond 
were required to prohibit an official from performing an 
unlawful ac t 
The gravamen of the Petition for Writ of Prohibition 
(Appendix page 40) was to prohibit the respondents as 
City Officials from paying monies to Gibbons and Reed 
Company for improvements not stated in the notice of 
intention. As previously stated, supra, Section 10-16-
7(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, prohibits the govern-
ing body from making any improvements not stated in 
the notice of intention. The narrowing of Main Street, 
the lowering of the grade of Main Street, and the block-
age of North-South traffic at the South Temple inter-
section were not stated in the notice of intention (POINT 
II of Appellants' Argument), and consequently, the City 
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officials were without jurisdiction or authority to use 
special improvement district funds to pay for these so-
called improvements. 
The answer to the Petition for Writ of Prohibition 
admits that the special improvement district had bor-
rowed $876,000.00 from the general fund of the City and 
that the City had paid $17,375.13 of said funds and in-
tended to pay additional funds to Gibbons and Reed 
Company for labor and material furnished in connection 
with said improvements. Respondents' answer had not 
been filed on the 31st day of July when Judge Snow 
signed the Alternative Writ of Prohibition but the Depo-
sition of Lawrence A. Jones had been taken which es-
tablished the factual premise aforesaid (Appendix pages 
37-39). 
Based upon these allegations and the posture of the 
case as it existed on the 31st day of July, 1974, in issu-
ing the Writ Judge Snow concluded that the respondents 
were acting and were intending to act in excess of their 
statutory authority in the particulars aforesaid and that 
petitioner had no plain, adequate, or speedy remedy in 
the ordinary course of law to prohibit the unlawful ac-
tivities. In addition to not following the rule that one 
District Judge cannot overrule another acting District 
Judge having identical authority and stature, Utah v. 
Morgan, U. 2d , 527 P. 2d 225 (1974), it is sub-
mitted that the trial Court erred in holding: that before 
an extraordinary writ can be issued under Rule 65B-
(b) (4) that it must be established at a trial upon the 
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merits that the respondents were acting without or in 
excess of jurisdiction; that the "Alternative Writ of Pro-
hibition" was a temporairy restraining order; and that 
petitioner had failed to comply with Rule 65A(c) with 
regard to the posting of a bond. 
Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure abol-
ishes extraordinary writs by name, according to State 
of Utah v. Henry Ruggeri, District Judge, 19 Utah 2d 
216, 429 P. 2d 969, (1967), "* * * the remedy re-
mains the same as when names were important * * *". 
Writs of Prohibition to restrain public officials from per-
forming alleged unlawful ministerial acts have been 
issued in the State of Utah without any mention of a 
bond being required, Parkinson v. State Bank of Millard 
County, 84 Utah 278, 35 P. 2d 814 (1934); Barnes v. 
Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 P. 878 (1929). The Parkin-
son case, supra, involved the application for Writ of Pro-
hibition to restrain a bank commissioner from paying 
general claims until the balance of a legatee's claim was 
satisfied. The Writ was issued notwithstanding the fact 
that an appeal was pending in the Utah Supreme Court 
determination. The Barnes case, supra, involved the 
issuance of a Writ of Prohibition to prevent the city from 
contracting to purchase certain electrical equipment. 
With reference to the propriety of the Alternative Writ 
of Prohibition being granted, the Barnes case stated: 
" I t is next contended by counsel amici curiae 
that this court should not grant the applica-
tion for the writ of prohibition, for the reason 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
that plaintiffs have a plain, speedy, and ade-
quate remedy by injunction As a general rule 
prohibition will not lie where the applicant 
has any other plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law. When 
there is another remedy, the writ is not de-
mandable as a matter of right. The writ may, 
however, be issued in the exercise of a sound 
judicial discretion. The law on the subject, as 
now understood was stated by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Re Rice, Peti-
tioner, 155 U. S. at page 402, 15 S. Ct. 152, 
39 L. Ed. 198, as follows: 
'Where it appears that the court whose 
action is sought to be prohibited has clear-
ly no jurisdiction of the cause originally, 
or of some collateral matter arising there-
in, a party who has objected to the jur-
isdiction at the outset, and has no other 
remedy, is entitled to a writ of prohibi-
tion as a matter of right. But where there 
is another legal remedy by appeal or 
otherwise, or where the question of the 
jurisdiction of the court is doubtful, or 
depends on facts which are not made mat-
ter of record, or where the application 
is made by a stranger, the granting or re-
fusal of the writ is discretionary.' 
The rule there announced was referred to with 
approval by this court in Oldroyd v. McCrea, 
65 Utah, 142, 235 P . 580, 40 A. L. R. 230. 
We recognize the importance of placing reas-
onable restrictions upon the use of the writ of 
prohibition, and have no desire to encourage 
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the practice of invoking the original jurisdic-
tion of this court by resorting to these extra-
ordinary remedies. This court has, however, in 
a great many of the cases cited by plaintiffs, 
entertained applications for writs in situations 
similar to the situation here involved. We think 
that the facts and circumstances of this case 
justify us in entertaining plaintiff's applica-
tion for the writ." 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the discretion 
exercised by Judge Snow in issuing the Alternative Writ 
of Prohibition should not have been set aside by another 
District Court Judge on an ex parte application; that 
the extraordinary remedy (Writ of Prohibition) is dis-
tinct from injunctive relief; that the same does not have 
to be issued only after a trial on the merits establishing 
lack of jurisdiction. 
A permanent Writ of Prohibition should be issued 
by this Court prohibiting respondents from paying any 
sums from improvement district Project No. 38-480 to 
Gibbons and Reed Company for work done and material 
fuimished in connection with narrowing Main Street, 
changing the grade of the street, and widening the base 
of the Brigham Young Monument, items not set forth 
in the notice of intention to form said district. 
POINT V. 
THE CONTRACTS DATED JUNE 12, 1974, 
AND SEPTEMBER 5,1974, BETWEEN SALT 
LAKE CITY CORPORATION AND GIB-
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BONS AND REED COMPANY WERE NOT 
AWARDED PURSUANT TO PUBLIC BID 
AS REQUIRED BY LAW. 
The base bid of Gibbons and Reed Company was 
$4,122,254.15 which was substantially in excess of the 
Engineer's original estimate of $2,875,189.75. In order 
to bring the project in line with the estimate, deletions 
were made of some of the proposed improvements, among 
which were the suspended sidewalk system and the 
storm sewer, (Appendix page 36). The suspended side-
walk system, which was designed to allow surface water 
to drain through the sidewalk onto a concrete underlay-
menit, was estimated to cost $731,434.50. The storm sewer 
was estimated to cost $202,534.50. With these deletions 
it was necessary to replace the proposed storm sewer 
with a "shallow drainage system", estimated to cost $22,-
786.00 and a "grout system" sidewalk (pavers being set 
directly in grout), costing $540,789.02 (Exhibit P-3, Ap-
pendix page 36). The "grout system" and the "shallow 
drainage system" were not the subject of public bid and 
the plans and spetifications for these items were not 
contained in the plans and specifications referred to in 
the Notice to Contractors, Appellants contend that the 
trial Court was in error in finding, to the effect, that these 
additions need not be the subject of public bid and were 
in accordance with law. 
The June 12th contract did not provide for a "grout 
system" sidewalk. In this regard it merely changed the 
quantity of heavier, reinforced pavers which were to be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
used in connection with the suspended sidewalk system 
(Appendix pages 13, 14). When it was discussed at the 
first hearing that the "grout system" and the "shallow 
drainage system" were not in the June 12th contract, 
notwithstanding representations to the contrary in Ex-
hibit P-3, (Appendix pages 32-36), the trial Judge was 
left in doubt as to what the June 12th contract contained, 
thus necessitating an evidentiary hearing on the matter. 
Prior to the second hearing, Salt Lake City Corpo-
ration and Gibbons and Reed Company entered into a 
Supplemental Agreement dated September 5, 1974, by 
which the veory line items which were previously changed 
in the June 12th contract, to-wit: items 91 through 98 
and 106 through 111, were deleted and new items sub-
stituted under those numbers. The Supplemental Agree-
ment is set forth in full in the Appendix pages 9-12. By 
the Supplemental Agreement the "grout system" was 
added to the project for the additional sum over the 
contract price of $784.02. The die was cast, however, 
with respect to the "shallow drainage system", an "Or-
der for Extra Work" dated July 2, 1974, authorized the 
payment to Gibbons and Reed Company of $14,725.00 
few: this additional item. In view of the pattern set by 
the "Order for Extra Work" for the "shallow drainage 
system" and the Affidavit of Warren R. Fenn stating 
the position of Gibbons and Reed Company that any 
additional work under the June 12th contract would 
have to be handled under "Extra Work Orders", it ap-
peared that the City would be obligated to pay the ad-
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ditional sum of $540,789.02 over the contract price for 
the "grout system". 
The revised plans and specifications necessitated by 
the deletions of the aforementioned items did not arrive 
from Barton and Aschman, the architectxual firm em-
ployed by the City, until June 11, 1974, (R. 142, Dist. 
Ot No. 220475). Mayor Garn testified that the signing 
of the June 12th contract was delayed until the revised 
plans and specifications had arrived, (Appendix page 
22). 
Had the several contractors who evidenced an in-
terest in the project been given notice of the revised 
plans and specifications by a new Notice to Contractors 
and given an opportunity to bid the project as revised, 
they may have been interested in submitting bids 
resulting in substantial savings to the City. The law in 
this particular is stated in 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Works 
and Contracts, Section 66, Page 921, as follows: 
"After bids have been made upon the basis of 
plans and specifications prepared by public 
authorities and given out to all interested bid-
ders, no material or substantial change in any 
of the terms of such plans and specifications 
will be allowed without a new advertisement 
giving all bidders opportunity to bid under the 
new plans and specifications. 
Thus, public authorities cannot enter into a 
contract with the lowest bidder containing 
substantial provisions beneficial to him, not 
included in or contemplated in the terms and 
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specifications upon which bids were invited; 
the contract which they execute must be the 
contract offered to the lowest responsible bid-
der by advertisement, and any contract en-
tered into containing substantial provisions 
beneficial to the bidder which were not includ-
ed in the specifications, is void. Any other 
course would prevent real competition, lead to 
favoritism and fraud, and defeat the purpose 
of the law in requiring contracts to be let upon 
bids made upon advertised specifications." 
When asked why a new Notice to Contractors was not 
given, Mr. Fentan testified in his Deposition, 
" I just don't think it was ever considered. The 
low bid came in and it was just decided upon 
to negotiate with the low bidder." (Appendix 
page 29). 
Mr. Harmsen testified, however, that the City Commis-
sion did consider the question of rebidding the project 
after the need for revising the plans became apparent 
but decided against it for the reasons that it would cause 
delay, prices would increiase because of inflation, and 
that in their experience costs could not be cut by rebid-
ding the contract (Tr. 539, 540). 
The excerpt from Exhibit "A" to the Findings and 
Conclusions of Law set forth at page 8 of the Appendix 
shows that Shocker Constmction Company was the low 
bidder for the suspended sidewalk systems at $650,083.00 
as compared to $731,434.50 for Gibbons and Reed Com-
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pany. Nobody knows what a bid would have been for 
the "grout system" which consisted of smaller, unrein-
forced pavers set directly in grout, and Mr. Harmsen and 
the Commissioners, conclusion that costs could not be 
cut by rebddding of the contract is umf ounded. It appears 
from the above figures, which were before the Commis-
sioners that the cost of the "grout system" could have 
been decreased substantially by awarding that portion of 
the contract to Shocker Construction Company after ob-
taining a new bid. The nature of the work involved in the 
"grout system" was also much less exacting and com-
plicated which would have reduced the price. In this 
connection, Mr. Fenton testified: 
Q. "Would it be a fair statement, Mr. Fen-
ton, to say that * * * it was one of the most 
critical features of the contract that these pil-
low blocks be placed in such a way that not 
even one-eighth inch variation would be tol-
erated; is that not a fact? 
A. I 'm not sure of the exact dimensions. I 
know they had to be very, very accurate. 
Q. With respect to the nature of the work 
now in the system that you have identified here 
as the grout system, the nature of the work in 
laying those blocks is less critical, is it not, 
than the nature of the work required in terms 
of the suspended system * * *? 
A. Yes, I think that would be a fair state-
ment." (Tr. 485 and 486). 
By awarding the contract to Gibbons and Reed Com-
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pany after deleting the "suspended system" and substi-
tuting the "grout system" substantial benefits resulted 
to Gibbons and Reed not available to other contractors 
since the nature and complexity of the work would have 
been taken into consideration and reflected in new bids. 
Section 10-16-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides, among other things 
«* * * improvements in the special improve-
ment district shall be made only under contract 
duly let to the lowest responsible bidder * * *. 
If the price bid by the lowest and best re-
sponsible bidder exceeds the estimated costs 
as determined by the engineer of the munici-
pality, the governing body may nevertheless 
award a contract for the price so bid. The 
governing body may in any case refuse to 
award a contract and may obtain new bids 
after giving a new notice to contractors or may 
determine to abandon the district or not to 
make some of the improvements proposed to 
be made." 
Defendants made it appear that the June 12th con-
tract was awarded on the basis of deletions alone in 
order to fit it into the above statutory provision that the 
Catty could elect not to make some of the improvements. 
By entering into the September 5, 1974, supplemental 
agreement defendants were attempting to do indirectly 
what they could not do directly by the June 12th agree-
ment. The machinations of defendants in these particu-
lars were calculated to avoid the statutory mandate of 
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public bidding. The law applicable to the instant matter 
is set forth in an annotation appearing at 69 A. L. R. 
697, entitled "Evasion of Law Requiring Contract for 
Public Work to be Let to Lowest Responsible Bidder 
by Subsequent Changes in Contract After it Has Been 
Awarded Pursuant to that Law". Lassiter and Company 
v. Taylor, 99 Fla. 819, 128 So. 14 (1930), is reported in 
full in that annotation. In that case after the contract 
was let, the kind of paving was changed from concrete 
to "Densite" without calling for new bids. The Court 
held that the City Council had no right to thwart the 
law requiring contracts to be let to the lowest responsible 
bidder. The Court stated: 
"We now have before us a case where the con-
tract was made in violation of a mandatory 
provision of the charter, which requires such 
contracts to be let to the lowest responsible 
bidder. We quite agree with the Supreme 
Court of California, when it says: 'This, then, 
is the undoubted rule, that, when a contract is 
expressly prohibited by law, no court of justice 
will entertain an action upon it, or upon any 
asserted rights growing out of it. And the 
reason is apparent; for to permit this would 
be for the law to aid in its own undoing". 
Another annotation appearing at 135 A. L. R. 1265, 
is also applicable. It is entitled "Statute Requiring Com-
petitive Bidding for Public Contract as Affecting the 
Validity of the Agreement Subsequent to the Award of 
the Contract to Allow the Contractor Additional Com-
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pensation for Extras or Additional Labor and Material 
Not Included in the Written Contract". The general 
rule in the annotation is stated as follows: 
"In general, but subject to certain limitations 
and exceptions which are considered in subse-
quent subdivisions of this annotation statutes 
requiring the letting of public contracts to the 
lowest bidder are regarded as rendering in-
valid and unenforceable any subsequent agree-
ments to pay one to whom public contract has 
been duly awarded additional compensation 
for extra work and materials not included in 
the original contract at least where the addi-
tional compensation exceeds the amount for 
which public contracts may be made without 
competitive bidding." 
The exceptions noted in the annotation involve situ-
ations in which alter the contract was let and work 
begun, modifications were necessary due to unantici-
pated changes in the nature of the work, a situation not 
applicable to the case at hand since all of the changes 
required to be made in the instant matter were known 
prior to the award of the June 12th contract. Section 
10-7-20, Utah Code Annotaed, 1953, is also applicable. 
I t provides, among other things, that improvements cost-
ing in excess of $12,000.00 must be awarded to the lowest 
responsible bidder. 
Assuming that the supplemental agreement and the 
extra work order for the drainage system were legitimate 
and based upon unforeseen circumstances which they 
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were not, in view of the fact they both involved ex-
penditures in excess of $12,000.00, it would appear that 
under Utah Law these additions should have been 
awarded on the basis of public bid. It is submitted 
that the trial Judge erred in concluding that the June 
12th agreement and the supplemental agreement of Sep-
tember 5th were in accordance with the law and were 
valid. 
CONCLUSION 
From the notice of intention to the letting of con-
tracts to Gibbons and Reed Company, the City failed 
to abide by statutory standards which were adopted for 
the protection of the property owner and public. Main 
Street is the life-blood of the abutting property owner 
and the City should be held to the highest of standards 
in proceedings to alter or modify the street by way of 
beautifimtion or otherwise. There should be no doubt 
about what standard the City is using to measure the 
requisite number of protests or the effective date when 
protests to the formation of a district will be considered. 
There should be no argument about the sufficiency of 
the notice of intention apprising property owners of the 
material features of the project. The public should not 
be driven to a search of the plans and specifications on 
file with the City Engineer to apprise themselves of the 
nature of the project. Contracts should be let to the 
lowest responsible bidder and the public should not have 
to speculate about who might have been the lowest 
bidder under revised plans and speculations. The ques-
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tion of what the contract contains should not have to 
be determined only after a trial on the merits. 
To put the blessing of validity on the proceedings of 
the City in the instant matter would be for the "law to 
aid in its own undoing", Lassiter, supra. Appellants 
should be granted the relief prayed for and Curb & Gut-
ter Extension No. 38-480 and all things flowing therefrom 
should be declared unlawful and void. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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